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SYMPOSIUM ISSUE
The Street, The Lab, The Courtroom, blind, sequential routines with apparent success. Even
so, the Guide did place the burden of proving the
The Meeting Room
James M. Doyle', Steven Penrod, Ph.D.,
Margaret Bull Kovera, Ph.D. and Jennifer
Dysart, Ph.D.
The Mecklenburg Report 2 documenting the results
of the Illinois Pilot Program on Sequential DoubleBlind Identification Procedures will frustrate the most
violent partisans on both sides of the debate over the
future of eyewitness investigations.
Sadly, the Mecklenburg Report will also disappoint
a broad audience of practitioners in the middle that
hoped for guidance-for something to do (or avoid
doing) to minimize the number ofimprisoned innocents
and untouched criminals that the DNA exoneration
cases warn us eyewitness memory can produce. The
Mecklenburg Report represents a taxing effort, its
author and the participating officers and departments
deserve our thanks, but the Report does not succeed
in combining the perspectives ofthe street investigator,
the laboratory scientist and the courtroom litigator into
a working synthesis. In the Report's aftermath, it is
clearer than ever that all three perspectives, their
potentials and their limitations must be recognized
before there can be a basis for action informed by
science.
If the Mecklenburg Report convinces the criminal
justice system's practitioners-investigators,
prosecutors, defenders and judges-that they cannot
wait around for legislatures to act, but must get
themselves to the table together, engage the scientists,
and work to find answers, then it can be a positive
contribution. But until that happens, the Mecklenburg
Report will leave us not far from where we were when
the National Institute ofJustice issued its path-breaking
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law
Enforcement3 ("the Guide") in 1999. We still have a
substantial body of laboratory results arguing for the
procedures that the Guide identified as good (pre-lineup instructions), or good but not preferred (sequential
lineup display), or simply potential (double-blind)
options. We now have a number of satisfied
jurisdictions around the country (including New Jersey,
Boston and Minneapolis) that have instituted double-

superiority of those procedures in operation on their
advocates, and the Mecklenburg Report's numbers
certainly do not lighten that burden. In fact, at least on
the surface, the Report's numbers seem to tend in the
opposite direction: against innovation. But if we look
beneath the surface, we find that even ifthe numerical
results noted in the Mecklenburg Report's field study
had been reversedthe Report still would not have
proved the superiority of double-blind sequential
procedures. The Mecklenburg Report reveals a study
that simply was not set up to test under scientific control
either double-blind, or sequential procedures. Nor
did it test scientifically any differences between blind
and not-blind simultaneous procedures.
These gaps are doubly unfortunate because five
years from now we will not be handling eyewitness
identifications in the same way that we handle them
now. Our arrays of dog-eared mug shots and hastily
improvised station house lineups are certain to be
supplemented-and are almost certainly doomedby a digital revolution that promises us quick, cheap,
convenient and comprehensively documented
identification procedures. We will have-some
departments now have-photo lineup capability on
laptops in squad cars. The capacity to present photoarrays on Palm Pilots has already been studied in the
labs. There soon will be many alternatives to dragging
victims to the precinct house in the middle of the night
and hiring line-up fillers from the homeless shelters in
order to test witness memory.
But to say we will have new equipment doesn't tell
us what we should do with it. What should we show
the witnesses on our laptops? "Sequential" displays?
How should we show it? With "double-blind"
techniques? What is the best procedure for the future?
The Mecklenburg Report does not really answer these
questions; in fact, the study it recounts does not really
ask them.
In hindsight it is clear that the Mecklenburg Report
reveals a crippling misunderstanding at the heart ofthe
field study it describes.
The Illinois Legislature issued a directive to pursue
a specific goal: compare a traditional technique of
eyewitness evidence gathering (the "simultaneous"
(Doyle, continued on page 14)
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(Doyle, continuedfrom page 13)
display of suspect and fillers by an officer who is aware
ofwhich lineup member is the suspect) with a proposed
improvement (the "sequential" display of suspect and
fillers by a "double-blind" administrator). But the
Mecklenburg Report is pervaded by an unexplained
determination to treat the Legislature's statement of a
goal as if it dictated a method. The failure to
acknowledge the distinction between goal and method
affected not only the Report on the study, but the design
of the study itself, and it imposed serious handicaps.
The muddle of method and goal explains why, in the
words of United States Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald,
the study "raises more questions than it answers."In faimess to the Illinois Legislature, it did what it
could to signal that the studies of eyewitness
procedures that should be conducted were not the
crude "traditional v. double-blind sequential" test the
Mecklenburg Report describes. The Legislature sought
an empirical answer to an empirical question by the
use of study instruments: "[D]esigned to elicit
information for comparative evaluation purposes, and
...
consistent with objective scientific research
methodology."' An appropriate objective scientific
research methodology exists, but the Mecklenburg
Report shows plainly that the study it discusses stopped
short of applying that methodology.
Four psychologists are mentioned prominently in
the Mecklenburg Report. Two, (Dr. Nancy Steblay
and Dr. Gary Wells) are bitterly critical of the report
and allege that their participation is exaggerated by
the Report's author; two (Dr. Ebbe Ebbesen and Dr.
Roy Malpass) consider the Mecklenburg Report on
the field study to be a valuable document. But all
four of these scientists disclaim any responsibility for
designingthe study. In fact, the study, like the Report,
is the product of a single hard-working lawyer for the
Chicago Police without formal training in social science
methods. The differences between legal and social
science practice show. For example, the Report
describes as "random" assignment methods which in
the legal world might be accepted as meriting the term,
but which no social scientist would recognize as true
random assignment. The result of this absence of a
science-based design is that the Mecklenburg Report
forfeits lessons that a truly scientific approach might
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have taught. Because the requirements of scientific
methodology were not imposed in the design of the
study, we now know much less than we could.
To begin with, a comparison of the new "doubleblind sequential" photo arrays with traditional
"simultaneous, not-blind" lineups, which merely lays
the two side-by-side, could never have been
informative in any scientific way. To properly assess
the "sequential" photo-arrays against "simultaneous"
procedures either both "simultaneous" and "sequential"
would have to be "not-blind," or both would have to
be double-blind-only then could we gauge which
factor was creating the effect we see. To properly
weigh the impact of "double-blind" procedures both
simultaneous and sequential procedures would have
to be run in "double-blind" and"not-blind" conditions

The Mecklenburg Report speaks for
many when it suggests that we expand
our inquiries and address further questions. But, real improvements in justice
system processes based on science will
only occur if cops, prosecuors and defenders take responsibility for framing
the right questions informed from the
beginning by scientific advice.
before the impact of "blindness" on investigations could
be assessed. In other words, a fatal "confound" is
built into the design ofthe Report, making it impossible
as a matter ofmethod, to retrieve authoritative answers
to the question the Legislature posed.
Besides, treating the question posed by the
Legislature as a methodological directive while ignoring
the Legislature's wish that "scientific methodologies"
govern the study hopelessly entangled the operational
issues of what is feasible on the street or in the precinct
with the reliability research issue of whether the new
procedures are worth doing in the first place.
For operational purposes it was natural for the
Report to use "suspect hits" as a proxy for "correct
identifications." A radical decline in "suspect hits" in
(Doyle, continued on page 15)
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did this happen? What does it mean? Unfortunately,
the design of the study and the Mecklenburg Report's
double-blind sequential procedures would indicate at recounting of it leave open a quite simple and obvious
least in a rough and ready way a very awkward explanation: the failure to account for a fundamental
disconnect between that particular identification difference between lab life and street life.
technique and police field operations. But it is important
When the lab scientists study the efficacy of an
to confine the "suspect hit" criteria to its operational identification technique, the single "simultaneous" or
significance. Obviously, ifwe were satisfied with every "sequential" test they scrutinize is almost always the
procedure that yields a 100 percent rate of "suspect witness'sfirst attempt at the identification ofa strangerhits" we would never have undertaken the enterprise perpetrator. This places the focus on the most influential
in the first place; we would have simply agreed to (and therefore dangerous) encounter, but it does not
regard the dozens of DNA exonerations (every one of automatically duplicate typical real-life practice; in real
them based on a "suspect hit" which seemed life a witness's live line-up performance is only one
"corroborated") and the dozens of active criminals who episode in the witness's career in the criminal justice
escaped justice in those cases as an inevitable cost of system. In real life-and in the experience of the
doing business. "Suspect hits" can tell us important witnesses depicted in the Mecklenburg Report-a
things about operations, but-even in the Hennepin "live" lineup experience can be (in most places, usually
County field study, where the results were radically is) preceded by a show-up, a "drive-by", or by a
different from those recited in two of the three photo-array. To treat the rate of suspect identifications
Mecklenburg Reportjurisdictions -they tell us very attained in first attempts in laboratories and third
little about the reliability questions at the heart of the attempts in the field (by witnesses who were, in effect,
issue of procedural superiority.
pre-tested on a show-up and a photo-array) as
Lab methods have their own limitations, and there equivalent doesn'tjust compare apples to oranges; it
is a danger ofunintentionally imposing those limitations compares apples to automobiles. It isn't particularly
if we undertake "lab-like" studies in the field.
surprising ifthird attempts by pre-tested witnesses (i.e.,
The specific limitation that concerns us here is not after two successful attempts and the dismissal of all
the worry that in the real world crime situation human of the unsuccessful witnesses) to identify a suspect in
memory operates in a qualitatively different way. There the field lead to fewer "filler ID's."
is no evidence for that fear. In studies pre-dating the
We don't know from the Mecklenburg Report that
Report, the rate of"filler ID's" in the lab and in the real this happened, but unfortunately we can't know that it
world seemed to match up fairly closely. In the didn 't happen, because the witnesses' history in the
occasional hyper-realistic laboratory study, such as Dr. investigation is not recorded or reported. The
Charles Morgan's controlled study of special forces Mecklenburg Report treats the field results as if they
troops who were asked to identify their interrogators were the lab results, but the study under examination
after a high stress interrogation (more than half identified did not follow the scientific tradition of recording
a "filler" in conventional simultaneous arrays) the results, experimental data, and so it failed to capture data that
again, are consistent with both the more conventional the lab would have noted as a matter of routine
lab setting experiments and with the scattered field experimental design. How many of these eyewitnesses
results from the United States and the United identified fillers in initial field procedures? How many
Kingdom.' But even while we acknowledge that the of these were filtered out of the process before the
lab studies and the field studies are examining the same subsequent, reported lineups? How many witnesses
processes of human memory, we have to remember in the subsequent lineups were performing a
that they do so in different contexts.
confirming recognition task following a successful
The Mecklenburg Report's most intriguing results suspect identification in a show-up or an array? Either
are its account of a "zero" rate of filler identifications of these features is at least as likely to have affected
in two ofthree jurisdictions. These results are unique the suspect/filler identification rates as might wholesale
among existing studies in the lab and in the field. How
(Doyle, continued on page 16)
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(Doyle, continuedfrom page 15)
police "tipping" ofwitnesses by police. (Although the
Mecklenburg Report persistently invokes the straw
man of sinister allegations ofpolice misconduct, in fact
no one claims either that intentional police misconduct
is the problem in the DNA eyewitness exoneration
cases, or that if it were the problem, procedural reforms
would be a silver-bullet solution to all intentional
"framing" of suspects.) If people are cheating, they
will continue to cheat, whatever procedures are
adopted. But, as things now stand we are provided
with no authoritative refutation of dark speculations
about of police "tipping" because a wide range of
data points-for example, the number of "low
confidence" filler identifications and the number of
failures to identify-were not captured in the study's
design.
Operations and reliability are muddled in a different
way when the "double-blind" technique is at issue. If
"double-blind" procedures add something to accuracy,
then implementing double-blind procedures-as
jurisdictions in Wisconsin, Massachusetts, New Jersey
and elsewhere have done-becomes a question of
police ingenuity, commitment and leadership in
surmounting operational challenges. But, if we ask
the police their opinion of the "double-blind" approach
before they are persuaded that it can contribute to
accuracy, the police can't be blamed for accepting
inconvenience and unfamiliarity as sufficient answer.
Besides, when the police are not invited to participate
in the design ofthe specific local double-blind sequential
technique but are simply presented with a "take it or
leave it" version in informal oral training an opportunity

The Mecklenburg Report represents a
taxing effort, its author and the participating officers and departments deserve
our thanks, but the Report does not suc-

ceed in combining the perspectives of
the street investigator, the laboratory
scientist and the courtroom litigator into

a working synthesis.

to confuse the performance is created and an
opportunity to exploit police expertise is lost.
The Mecklenburg Report speaks for many when it
suggests that we expand our inquiries and address
further questions. But, real improvement injustice
system processes based on science will only occur if
the cops, prosecutors and defenders take responsibility
for framing the right questions informed from the
beginning by scientific advice. The system's
practitioners not only have to take responsibility for
integrating science into practice; they have to take
responsibility for doing it together.
This will cause some discomfort. The Mecklenburg
Report documents a field study that followed the more
normal course ofreform efforts within the system: One
actor or another is charged with (or pro-actively
assumes) responsibility for mobilizing one scientific
advance or another, chooses its own scientists, closely
holds the information developed and makes (or
foregoes) reforms. This is not the only way.
Behind their adversarial routines, all criminal justice
practitioners share a common enemy-the innocent
defendant. No one wants the innocent in the system.
The police do not want to waste their time on the
innocent while the guilty go free to prey on new victims;
the prosecutors realize that highly publicized
exonerations in the cases they should have lost will
later cost them the cases they should win. Maybe
young defense lawyers go to law school with dreams
of defending the innocent, but experienced defense
lawyers see defending an innocent-particularly in an
eyewitness case-as a nightmare. Double-blind,
sequential lineup procedures-ifthey work to keep
the innocent out of the system-are to everyone's
advantage, and they should get a genuine scientific test
for that reason alone.
It is also worth remembering that the question of
eyewitness identification reform is not an all-or-nothing
matter. Sophisticated police departments might, after
testing, decide that some crime situations (for example,
where there is a substantial amount of corroborating
information) call for traditional methods of
identification, while other, shakier, cases call for the
more cautious, conservative double-blind sequential
approach. "Double-blind" administration on its own
(even if "simultaneous") also serves important law
(Doyle, continued on page 31)
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Getting to Truth Before It Falls into
the Hands of the Lawyers: Pursuing
Accuracy in Criminal Cases

envisioned when it began to emphasize 75 years
ago that defense counsel at trial was essential to
getting at the truth.' And the place, they thought,
where truth was to be found was trial where it was
James B. Zagel'
judge and jury, after hearing prosecution and
Societies have always wrestled with the overall defense, not prosecutor, who decided the outcome.
question of the reliability of witnesses and, even now, This reliance on defense counsel to help us get to
when the legal rules are mostly settled, we still worry the truth was a key element in the first cases in which
about perjury, mistakes, delusions and the integrity of the Supreme Court sought to bring constitutional
memory. At issue today is the relatively small subset of regulation to eyewitness identification.'
But defenders are not duty bound to see that the
the witness problem-just that one moment when the
witness points to one person and says that is the per- truth comes out. Ifthe client is guilty they are obliged
son whose conduct I have described. For most witnesses to crime, the phrase "That's the man" is shortest part of the story they offer. Concern about its accuracy has been with us for centuries.
If solutions were easily found, this would not be
an age old concern. Be wary of those who, with
great confidence, offer the miracle cure to a problem
we all recognize. The results of the Illinois doubleblind eyewitness pilot program offer a vivid example
of why what some think obvious is often not so.
There is another point here; failure teaches as much
or more than does success and we ought not to
turn our back on any enterprise that seeks to make
our investigations and adjudications better. The great
value of tests, like the one we discuss herein, is they
keep us from a terrible kind of optimism that, once
disappointed, can lead us to abandoning the search
for something better.
What Is It We Are Trying To Repair and

Why?
Our world of arrest, prosecution and defense has
changed. The idea that truth arises out of trial in an
adversary system is still with us but mostly in theory
not practice. Plea bargains are the dominant mode.

My colleague, Judge Lynch in New York, has
accurately described the process this way:
"[T]he prosecutor ... is the central adjudicator
of facts ... arbiter of ... legal issues and of the
appropriate sentence to be imposed. Potential
defenses are presented by the defendant ... to a
prosecutor, who assesses their factual accuracy and
then decides the charge of which the defendant

should be adjudged guilty..."'
This is a far cry from what the Supreme Court

17 1Public Interest Law Reporter
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It is critical to establish an identification before the eyewitness is subject to outside suggestion and a fhise identification is made. A false identification often has ireversable
consequences.

to use all legally permissible means to see that the
truth does not come out. This became particularly
clear when we thought about what a lawyer should
do at a lineup. Suppose the client tells his lawyer
"Yeah, I stole the stuff but I'm sure no one saw me
inside." Then the lawyer sees his client in a proposed
line-up of seven, six of whom are Hispanic, and his
client is the only blond white man in the group. Does
(Zagel, continued on page 18)
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(Zagel, continuedfrom page 17)
counsel want a fairer or more accurate lineup, one
more likely to elicit the truth? If he gets one and the
identification is made, he has deprived his client of
a good argument at trial. What if the police ask the
lawyer for suggestions to improve the lineup and
agree that they will follow these suggestions? Does
the lawyer improve the process to the detriment of
his client? The dilemma here is stark because, unlike
interrogation, the lawyer can not simply advise his
client not to participate in the lineup. The
identification procedure is going to happen. The
lawyer is not authorized to decide simply that it is
right to have a fair identification parade; the lawyer
is only authorized to seek the kind of parade that is
good for the client.
Many eventually accepted this state of affairs
where, in a trial, getting to the truth was not the
single overriding value.' I think they did so for two
reasons. First, the thought was that, in nearly all
cases, the truth came out anyway. Second, there
were important social values found in procedural
fairness and in giving the defendant a meaningful role
in his or her defense. The price of an occasional
criminal going free was thought to be worth paying
to achieve these good things. This tradeoff has
always been controversial. It might not survive a
public referendum.
The tradeoff also rests on premises that
professionals find hard to accept. It is not easy to
find scholars (though not so hard to find judges)
who actually believed that trial was really a good
way to get at the truth in hard cases; the scholarly
defense of the system was based upon its service
to other democratic values. And even where the
adversarial system could work, it was dependent
on having a skilled, adequately funded advocate on
both sides of the case. This last condition was often
unmet.
In the decades that followed the criminal
procedure upheavals of the 1960s, there was a
lukewarm to cool acceptance of the way criminal
cases were handled: lukewarm to cool because we
were in the midst of a rise in crime that lasted for
decades and, only relatively recently, subsided;
accepted because there was much in popular media,
Summer 2006
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol11/iss2/6

shows like NYPD Blue and Law and Order, that
portrayed a system that got the right result. The right
result is the common result, but it is not because of
our system of trials. It is because, in most cases,
there is no serious question of guilt. The evidence is
usually more than good enough and, if it isn't, the
prosecutors frequently won't take a chance on the
case. Perfection is unattainable, but getting it right
in the largest percentage of cases is not good enough
even if that percentage is in the high nineties. The
consequences of error are too grave.
But still we toddled along with what we had. The
volume of criminal cases, which was associated with
the rise in crime and the relatively poorly funded
defense services, led to fewer trials and what Judge
Lynch called an administrative system of criminal
justice. We would be that way today but for recent
events.
The public, as opposed to the defenders of the
world, was generally worried only about the guilty
going free. New science and today's news made
them worry, at least a little, about the innocent being
found guilty.
For this reason the importance of finding the truth
about guilt is valued more highly today than it has
been in many years. We might be in the midst of a
tectonic shift in perspective about crime,
investigation and the accused.
Some of this might seem strange to say to the
public. Haven't we always thought that the end of
the criminal justice system was to find out the truth?
Most people did, but no one who labors in this field
believes that truth is always revealed or acted upon.
There are unjustified convictions and unjustified
acquittals. Even under the better practices that we
will someday have, we will never reach perfection
because the truth is elusive, often beyond the ability
of humans to discover. But we won't stop
prosecuting. Crime has a devastating effect on its
victims and a large effect on the society in which
we live. We have never decided to leave the guilty
or the innocent to the judgment of heaven. We ought
then to do the best we can to lock up all the guilty
and free all the innocent, knowing that we will
sometimes fail.
(Zagel, continued on page 19)
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What Has Led Us to Try Now?
The short answer to this question is that there is no
sudden change, just a gaudy tipping point. The shift to
concern for truth has been building for a while.
Start with Mirandav. Arizona6 and the de-emphasis on admissions of guilt. Mirandacan now be
read as an implied endorsement of the reliability of
eyewitnesses and, perhaps, of the very forensic evidence that is now under attack, say, bite marks, and
even of reliable evidence excludible under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court understood it was holding that
even voluntary confessions, whose truth value was unquestioned, were to be excluded from evidence. This
de-emphasis of truth and re-emphasis on procedural
protections did not last very long. The Supreme Court
limited the scope of Miranda.'The Court (in an opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall) also decided to permit the police to use deception to induce
confessions' and narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rules based on the Fourth Amendment.9

'A-

The idea of science in law enforcement is relatively new.
Identification by fingerprinting, br example, was not broadly
accepted in the United States until the 1920s.

evidence because the law permitted anybody to offer
opinion evidence.
Fingerprints are a good example of the early evidence of experts. Fingerprints were used for identification in India in the 1850s.1 o Written work appeared
in 1881 and Galton's book was published in England
in 1892.11 By 1910, fingerprinting itself was in fairly
wide police use. 12 Despite this, it was not until 1911
that a reviewing court approved its use, but broad
acceptance did not come until the 1920s, and it was
not until the 1940s that courts said the prosecution
would no longer have to prove that no two fingerprints are alike.1 3 The course of admission of other
forms of identification evidence was similar. It took
time to get the courts to approve comparative micrography, microanalysis, questioned documents. Most
of the first scientific evidence dealt with traces and
marks which the jurors themselves could perceivefriction ridges, striations on bullets and so forth. As the
twentieth century went on, and science itselfbegan to
deal with things not directly observable, the law began
to take in serology, general chemistry and neutron activation analysis. In all these cases, though, one reason
the courts moved slowly was the resistance of defense counsel to the admission of such evidence because it rarely served any purpose other than to incriminate their clients.
DNA evidence was accepted with amazing speed
precisely because it could exonerate as well as incriminate. There were very few to fight tooth and nail against
its admissibility because the prosecutor or defender
who objected vigorously to DNA evidence knew that,
in the next case, they might be offering that same evidence. DNA, too, came to the courts at a time when
standards of what constituted reliable and valid science had become clearer. DNA analysis had the advantage of service as a tool in many sciences, not merely
criminalistics. The broader use ofDNA analysis meant
the discipline had been critically reviewed by many
more scientists than, say, fingerprints.
It is true that the advent of closerjudicial scrutiny
of expert witnesses in recent years1 4 has called into
question much ofthe science that is offered in the courtroom, but the outcome of disputes about questioned
document examination, serology, fiber analysis,

Despite this renewed endorsement of the value of
confessions, there is no doubt that the Supreme Court,
and every sane person for that matter, would prefer
that guilt be determined by incontestable evidence like
that found three times every week in New York, Miami and Las Vegas by an infallible corps of Crime Scene
Investigators. It is science that created that gaudy tipping point.
The entry of science into the courtroom started at
a very slow pace. Most of the earliest expert testimony from doctors and alienists was admitted into (Zagel, continuedon page 20)
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(Zagel, continuedfrom page 19)
(maybe, even fingerprints) are not for today's discussion. DNA survived its first tests and it proved that
there were a small, but nonetheless very meaningful,
number ofwrongful convictions. DNA science teaches
there is, in a certain class of cases, a class of evidence
that, if properly handled, is conclusive. Of course,
properly handled is not inevitable, but it put forth an
implicit message. We can get to the truth better than
we had gotten to it before. And this is why pilot programs are undertaken: not because eyewitnesses can
become the legal equivalent ofrecombinant strands of
DNA, but because DNA showed that we can do better. Obviously only if we try to do better.
There will be attention paid to the causes ofwrongful
convictions, now the predominant element is bad eyewitness identifications. So too, we will look at error
rates in particular kinds of cases." These studies might
help us in our scrutiny of past errors.
Professional investigators of crime have known for
hundreds of years that evidence can lead to the wrong
person, that some eyewitness identifications are worthless, that some confessions are worthless and that some
forensic analyses are worthless. From the perspective
of the police and prosecutors, the solution was either
not to charge in those cases or to drop the charges if
already brought. The defense often proposed this solution. The problem was handled in house and there
was always the final safeguard of the trial.
What DNA told the public is that a trial does not
protect adequately against these errors if the prosecutor decides to go forward with the case. DNA put an
enormous dent into the idea that the adversary system
is the best way to protect against false convictions.
The belief that even good faith errors made earlier in
the process will be detected and repaired as the case
moved through our adversary system has lost some of
its hold on our society. While the adversary system
might serve many social values apart from its detecting the truth of accusations, all these values collectively seem no longer to outweigh the risk of that the
judgments it produces may be untrustworthy. It is not
that these values are to be disregarded, it is the degree
to which they are fostered that is questioned. When a
crime victim sees the perpetrator unjustly acquitted, it
is small consolation to tell them that it is better that ten
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guilty men go free than one innocent man be convicted,
but the society as a whole accepts, or at least understands, this policy. Now the message is, not only do
we let those ten guilty go free by the way, we also
send quite a few innocent men to prison too. That
message is not well received.
So the turn now is to making things right before the
lawyers in the adversary system get their hands on it.
What Can We Expect from Science?
Science proceeds by evaluating ideas, theories,
guesses, conjectures, hopes and dreams. It does this
by experiments of all sorts and observations.
The idea that there is science in law enforcement is
not so old. Early criminology was a form of moral philosophy as in Cesare Beccaria.' 6 One of its first scientists was an anthropologist Cesare Lombroso,17 who
died less than one hundred years ago. Many of his
theses seem laughable today but he used the inductive
method of science as well as he could. Our understanding of criminology is still very much in flux. We
seem to know that more police officers and more
people in prisons are good at reducing crime rates.
Some ofthe standard explanations about strong economies, too many people under thirty, order maintenance
policing, strong gun laws, capital punishment, changing drug habits and markets all remain unproved." But
we are not talking about criminology here, it is
criminalistics or police science which largely concerns
itself with helping to find out, by examination ofphysical objects, who did what, when and how.
In recent times, I have noted, some accepted police science has come under question. This is not
unique to police science. The scientific enterprise is
filled with failure and mistakes. There is a well-known
maxim offered to some first-year medical students
which runs this way: "half ofwhat we teach you will be
wrong, we just don't know which half."
Mistakes in science are not limited to earlier centuries like the phlogistan theory of fire. The theory is a
laughing stock today but it was clever in its time. The
inventor believed there was a combustible substancephlogistan-consumed by combustion which required
air. After the phlogistan was gone the residue weighed
less than the original product as is demonstrated by
the case of ashes which weigh less than the burnt log.
(Zagel, continued on page 32)

Public Interest Law Reporter 20

Public Interest Lawv Reporter' 20
8

